The legal response to risk used to be confined to tort law, which was conceived as the quintessential private law subject. It was taught in the first year of law school and rarely thereafter. Scholars wrote endless articles about proximate cause. Yet the boundary between public and private law never was observed. Morton Horwitz has shown us that tort law played an essential role in resource allocation in the nineteenth century. 1 Workers' compensation was the focus of constant struggle around the tum of the century. And recently legislatures have introduced public law solutions to the risks that arise in automobile travel, pollution, the use of consumer products, the workplace, encounters with crime, medical care -the list is virtually endless. The fundamentally political nature of the struggle over who will inflict risk on whom and with what consequences no longer can be obscured. During the second Reagan administration these struggles will become more acute and more visible. The three books reviewed here inescapably are part of that struggle. The first is a thinly disguised apology for capital. Bardach and Kagan urge that the state defer to capital, which will exhibit paternalistic concern for the risks it inflicts on all citizens. The other two books openly champion the victims. Carson locates the source of risk in the political economy of Britain's North Sea oil exploration. Nelkin and Brown allow victims to speak about their struggles to control risk in the workplace. Scholarly disagreement over the response to risk mirrors the political struggle between those who inflict it and those who suffer it.
I. MALIGN NEGLECT In Going by the Book, Bardach and Kagan direct their criticism against the regulatory agencies that enforce environmental, worker health and safety, and other "social" regulations. Their object is to show that much regulation is unwarranted and its enforcement counterproductive2 and to propose an alternative. The villain of the piece is the "unreasonable" inspector who follows the letter of the law.
Evaluating this book poses serious difficulties, chiefly because the empirical status of the authors' arguments is unclear. They base their judgments about the "reasonableness" of regulatory behavior almost entirely on discussions with the owners and managers of regulated industries and virtually never talk to those the regulations were intended to benefit -workers, in most instances. As we shall see, 3 the latter offer a very different assessment. Even among the regulated industries, however, Bardach and Kagan make no effort to obtain a representative sample. Indeed, it is not clear that they are describing reality at all. In their one explicit discussion of method they concede:
Our objectives . . . are more analytical than empirical. Hence any errors in interpreting a firm's real motives are not damaging to our argument, as long as responses of the kind we describe are plausible responses to legalistic enforcement and occur in the world with at least some frequency. [P. 113 n.27 .] This attitude toward evidence may explain why the authors sometimes concoct "quotations," which they present as what some unreasonable inspector might have said (pp. 85-86), why they offer imaginary accounts of what a regulatory· agency legally might do as proof of its unreasonableness in fact, 4 and why, while acknowledging the dangers of generalization, they repeatedly present horror stories as representative examples (pp. xiii, 7) . It is difficult to criticize the social science of "as if." 5 If Bardach and Kagan are cavalier in their treatment of evidence, at least they are explicit about their political allegiances. They begin the book by declaring that they are "greatly pleased" at the "general direction and strength" of "the Republican regulatory counter-revolution in mid-1981" (p. xii) , and later they extol those "heroes in regula-2. For an empirically grounded argument that Canadian regulation is neither excessive nor onerous, see Nemetz, Sturdy, Uyeno, Vertinsky, Vertinsky & Vining, Toxic Chemical Regulation in Canada: Preliminary Estimates of Costs and Benefits, 25 CANADIAN PUB. AD. 405 (1982) .
3. See Part III infra.
4.
See, e.g., pp. 51-53 (examples of authorized fines, not those imposed).
5.
Cf. H. V AIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF " As IF" (1925) . [Vol. 83:772 tory affairs" who have relaxed rules and withheld sanctions (p. 213).6 Although the authors began with some concerns about the effectiveness of regulation, they concluded that so many others were studying the problem that they would do better to focus on unreasonableness (p. xv, n. *). They quote approvingly those who argue that excessive government spending and regulation have been responsible for high inflation, interest rates, and unemployment (pp. 14-15). And they invoke the fear that strict enforcement can drive entrepreneurs out of business (p. 137). Occasionally they reveal that their antipathy to enforcement actually reflects their opposition to the substance of the regulation. Thus, they are unhappy with affirmative action programs designed to redress discrimination or disadvantage. 7 And, similarly, they seem to find acceptable the present level of risk in the environment and at work. 8 Bardach and Kagan, in short, favor the status quo.
The authors also disclose their politics in the image of society that underlies their critique of regulation. For Bardach and Kagan, the good society, which we can and should try to achieve, is the "wellordered society" (p. xi), in which order is identified with submission to authority. It is a society without serious structural conflicts: "[e]xplanations of American politics that rely heavily on the idea of 'class' have never been very satisfactory" (p. 17). Members of this society respect "the basic norm of reciprocity that is essential to all cooperative relationships" (p. 106). Relationships can be cooperative because capital is essentially well-meaning and benevolent: " [M] anagers have at least some concern about the same social problems that preoccupy the regulators ... " (p. 132). Indeed, most capitalists wish to comply with reasonable regulations. The authors assume (without any evidence whatsoever) that eighty percent of entrepreneurs are "arrayed over a spectrum of borderline to moderate to really good apples" (p. 65). HIST. 412 (1969). 7. See, e.g., pp. 21, 50, 71, 199, 241, 322. 8. Thus they suggest that the level of work accidents was acceptable until "new hires" drove it upward, p. 105, and are prepared to tolerate the industry average oflost workday injuries. P. 162. They endorse the "bubble" concept and an offset policy with respect to air pollution, both of which would allow pollution to increase in some places if it declines in others. See pp. 175, 298. 9. They invoke the research of Keith Hawkins on the regulation of water pollution in Britain in support of this position. But Hawkins actually says something quite different:
What, then, is the problem? Why do we not find the "cooperative relationships" that underlie the "well-ordered society"? The serpents in this garden are the regulator and the worker. Regulators are too tough, unyielding, formalistic. The authors urge us to "think of [regulatory] unreasonableness as an epidemic sort of injury inflicted on society by careless regulators . . . or as a form of injustice inflicted by the strong upon the weak" (p. 305). But regulators really are just the pawn of the workers -the real culprits, the origin of the "threat of unreasonableness" (pp. 230-31) . Workers are likely to "abuse" their right to refuse to work in highly dangerous situations (p. 230) . 10 This view of relations between labor, capital, and the state reminds me of nothing so much as the claim by many Southern whites in the 1950's and 1960's: our Negroes like the way we treat them; it's just those outside agitators who stir up trouble.
In this peaceable kingdom, conflict not only is the product of "unreasonable" resistance by the victims rather than risk inflicted by employers and polluters but also is attributed to defects in individual character rather than to structural opposition. I I If some twenty percent of capitalists are recalcitrant, it is because they have a bad "attitude" (pp. 99-100), or perhaps because they have developed a "culture of resistance" (p. 114) through experiencing regulatory unreasonableness. Conflict is aggravated by "tough" inspectors and thus can be Securing compliance is a game to be played, in which the polluter's moves are directed toward resisting efforts at enforcement. Such resistance is portrayed as a ritual response even from a polluter who will be described as responsible or cooperative. For dischargers to "try it on" or "try to pull a fast one" is thought to be entirely normal behavior; they are expected to drag their heels or seek to avoid adopting in their full extent the measures required by the officer; "usually people are pretty slow to spend money," said an area man, "no matter which sector of the public they come from." Regulation, 5 LAW & POLY. Q. 35, 44 (1983) . It is hard to imagine how anyone could expect it to be otherwise.
Hawkins, Bargain and Bluffi Compliance Strategy and Dete"ence in the Enforcement of
Bardach and Kagan also urge emulation of the Swedish experience, pp. 230-31, but Swedish entrepreneurs offered no opposition to the enactment of health and safety legislation and regulations. Fleischauer, Occupational Safety and Health Law in REv. 283, 303 (1983) .
To offer an illustration closer to home, "the [Los Angeles] City Attorney's office has charged the Todd Shipyards Corporation, one of the nation's largest shipbuilders, with illegally disposing of polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCB's, by arranging to have the toxic chemical hauled to the Mojave Desert." Shipyard Charged in Illegal PCB Disposal on Coast, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1983 , at 39, col. 1. The City Attorney alleged that the company had obtained a bid of $43,915 to dispose of the transformers and oil legally but decided instead to have them removed on a noquestions-asked basis. "Tests at the Park Metal Company, where the transformers were dismantled, showed the level of contamination as high as 71,000 parts per million, and contamination on a suburban street was 56,565 parts per million." Id. The legal limit is 50 ppm. The only dumps authorized to accept PCBs are in Louisiana and Arkansas. Id. I doubt that Bardach and Kagan would characterize Todd Shipyards as a "bad apple."
10. For a discussion of the right of workers to refuse dangerous work, see note 126 infra and accompanying text.
11. For a critical view of this tendency to blame everything on "operator error," see C. PER-ROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH- RlsK TECHNOLOGIES 9, 246-49 (1984) . [Vol. 83:772 eliminated or at least alleviated by "good" inspectors who have an "ability to get along with people" (pp. 123-24, 127) .
Bardach and Kagan construct a model of society that fundamentally mystifies power. In their world workers harass managers (p. 231), regulators are strong and regulated industries weak (p. 305). 12 The authors appear wholly insensitive to the possibility that workers may fear to complain in front of their bosses and risk ·retaliation (pp. 147-48, 168, 231) . 13 They further obscure power relationships by drawing wildly inappropriate analogies between the regulator confronting the corporation and the police officer seeking to control "gatherings of juveniles or domestic quarrels" (p. 125). Inspection punishes a corporation, the authors suggest, in the same way that "the process is the punishment" when minor individual offenders are prosecuted criminally but ultimately discharged without fine or imprisonment (p. 163). And they note that "parents are not licensed for safety and effectiveness," implying that capital need not be either (p. 304). But the corporation does not resemble the individual accused, the adolescent, the abusive husband, or the parent -in either power, motivation, or resources. To substitute one for the other is to reduce class conflict to a domestic tiff. 14 Bardach and Kagan also draw a false analogy between the consumer and the worker (p. 246). Because the former appears to exercise the "liberty" to choose among consumer products, trading off safety and quality for price, so the worker does, 12. A recent empirical study found that about half of several categories of inspectors in Wis· consin had experienced threats or physical abuse at the hands of the industries they regulated. 
(1984).
13. Workers are said to be "protected" by their right to sue for reinstatement if fired for reporting regulatory violations. P. 229. For a description of worker fears, see note 117 infra and accompanying text. 14. The authors' strategy is similar to that of the tobacco companies, which seek to portray the infliction of passive smoking on nonsmokers as an interpersonal conflict. Taking full page advertisements in major newspapers "in the interest of common courtesy," R.J. Reynolds To· bacco Co. depicts the nonsmoker as suffering something between a "minor nuisance" and a "real annoyance" -never illness or death. Nonsmokers feel "a little powerless" in the invasion of their "privacy." Smokers, on the, other hand, have made "a very personal choice" of something that gives them "enjoyment." They are "doing something perfectly legal,'' yet they are "segre· gated, discriminated against, even legislated against." N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, (Magazine) , at 97. (I am particularly offended by this appropriation by the tobacco companies of the concept of discrimination against racial minorities, women, the disabled, and the elderly.)
This dispute is not between individuals but between the majority of nonsmokers and the tobacco companies that have fostered addiction to nicotine. See C. PERROW, supra note 11, at 312; P. TAYLOR, THE SMOKE RlNG: TOBACCO, MONEY, AND MULTINATIONAL POLITICS (1984) . Furthermore, the dispute is about illness and death, not "nuisances" or "annoyances." Studies in the United States, Britain, and Japan have documented an increase in lung cancer deaths among nonsmokers exposed to smokers. In the United States, passive smoking is estimated to cause between 500 and 5000 deaths a year, making it far more serious a threat than coke oven emissions, vinyl choloride, or benzene. and should, have the same "moral autonomy" to exchange bodily safety for higher wages (p. 246). This, of course, is precisely the commodification of labor by capitalism that obscures the compulsion and exploitation of workers in the guise of "freedom of contract. "1 5 15. The problem with equating workers and consumers is that, while consumers are free to buy any product they can afford, workers cannot choose any job; they are restricted by age, race, class, education, experience, gender, and geography, among other factors. Whereas the consumer can switch products or services with little or no cost, the worker is likely to experience at least temporary and possibly permanent unemployment -an unacceptable cost to anyone. The worker also must abandon the workmates and friends of a lifetime and may have to relinquish skills whose exercise gives great satisfaction. For the critique of the commodification of labor, which is at the root of economic analysis, see K. MARx, supra note 6, at PROBS. 700, 714 (1974) . For a critique of the ,application of cost-benefit analysis to worker health and safety standards, see Tucker, The Determination of Occupational Health and Safety Standards in Ontario, 1860 -1982 : From the Market to Politics to . • . ?, 29 McGILL L.J. 260, 297-309 (1983 .
Even were we to find two jobs, similar in training, experience, and responsibility but different in risk, that were paid differently, we would know only that people are risk aversive and that their preferences have some effect on wages. But this certainly does not prove that the particular difference correctly reflects the value workers place on risk, nor does it show that regulation and compensation are unnecessary. Economists rarely ask workers whether they would prefer higher wages in exchange for greater risks. A British survey asked respondents which of three jobs they would choose if, all else being equal, job A had an average amount of risk and reasonable pay, job B had twice as much risk and paid £10 more a week, and job C had three times as much risk and paid £20 more a week. Two-thirds of all respondents chose job A. Women were more reluctant to accept a riskier job for higher pay. Those in relatively risk-free work environments also were more reluctant and demanded higher risk premiums. P. PRESCOTT-CLARKE, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO- 145-49 (1982) . This suggests that people do not choose risk but strongly prefer the least risky work environment they believe they [Vol. 83:772 Looking at the world through the political and sociological lenses just described, Bardach and Kagan offer an explanation for the growth of regulation and the opposition it engenders, a critique of regulation, and proposals for an alternative. Their explanation inverts the customary understanding: regulation is not a response to special interests but an expression of those interests. Yet where the revisionist historians see these special interests as capital, 16 Bardach and Kagan appropriate that term (in a prime example ofNewspeak) to refer to the mass of workers or the general public (p. 16). Since these latter do not engage in spontaneous mass action, the authors must affix the blame elsewhere, indulging in the genetic fallacy to impugn the value of regulation by associating it with undesirable elements. They attribute pressure for regulation to unions (p. 16), the civil rights and anti-war movements (p. 13), "senators looking for issues with wide public support" (p. 14), "young lawyers" (p. 14), the "intelligentsia" (p. 17), and of course the media (p. 23) 17 -all of which they characterize as "dangerous potential predators" infesting "the political environment of regulatory officials" (p. 206). They attribute extraordinary influence to these forces: "During the 1960's and 1970's, these risks [of being criticized for leniency] were generally more threatening to regulators than were the risks of criticism from the business side ... " (p. 198) . 18 To the extent that such external forces do not explain the growth of regulation, Bardach and Kagan attribute it to spontaneous changes in personality -the "newly evolved, tougher breed of inspector" (p. 123); to "intermittent events" that are merely chance occurrences, not the product of any structural forces; 19 and to the inevitable tendency of can obtain, that blue-collar workers see no alternative to certain risks but are unwilling to accept more, and that white-collar workers enjoy a relatively risk-free environment and are very reluctant to accept any greater risk, even for a substantial wage premium. 18. Bardach and Kagan deplore criticism of regulators for failing to inspect sanitary violations in the food processing industry, for failing to respond to complaints of discrimination, and for failing to conduct sufficiently rigorous inspections of building code violations, unsanitary conditions in restaurants, slum housing, and nursing homes. 19. "Most prominent are physical catastrophes; scandals that expose presumptive laxity, corruption, or incompetency in the regulatory agency; dramatic scientific discoveries; flare-ups of racial or interco=unal violence; and changes in administration ••.• " P. 22. regulation to expand and rigidify (p. 184) . No mention is made of changes in the physical environment that might call for greater regulation or shifts in the configuration of political power that might explain why those who favor regulation temporarily prevailed.
WARDS INDUSTRIAL, WORK-RELATED AND OrHER RrsKS
Bardach and Kagan stay on the other side of the looking glass when explaining opposition to regulation: it is not resistance by regulated industries (compelled by the dynamic of capitalism) that engenders more vigorous enforcement but "regulatory unreasonableness" that drives otherwise compliant entrepreneurs to reluctant opposition (p. 26). Regulation destroys the "generalized commitment . . . 'to comply with the law' " (p. 113). The problem is "legalistic narrowmindedness" in enforcement (p. 92), which can spawn an organized culture of resistance (p. 114). Corporations are outraged by fines they view as undeserved, even if the fines are small (pp. 52, 105). They conceal information, even solutions to safety problems, out of fear of and resentment toward regulation (pp. 109, 145) 20 and anger at the aggressive behavior of the public interest lobby (p. 256). Unfortunately, the authors offer no evidence for their assertion that capital has a "generalized commitment" to comply with the law; 21 that, absent regulation, it spontaneously enhances safety and reduces pollution; or that it voluntarily discloses dangers and safety solutions. Indeed, their own evidence shows that capital vigorously opposes the enactment of regulations (p. 189), 22 conceals information in order to secure competitive advantages (p. 110), and initiates legalistic objections in order to reduce both inspections and prosecutions (pp. 113, 118-19) .
The authors' view of the pressures for and against regulation sets the stage for their critique. Bardach and Kagan begin with a structural explanation for why regulation tends to be unreasonable. 23 Rules in-20. In fact, they do so because of the goad of competition. The 80 nuclear power plants operating in the United States do not share information about failures or accidents. Partly as a result, they experience six and a half times as many shutdowns as Japanese plants, which do share information. Some of the problems that led to the incident at Three-Mile Island (TMI) had occurred previously at similar plants, but TMI was unaware of these events or the responses of the plant operators. After TMI the industry created a private Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, endowed with massive resources and personnel. But operators remain reluctant to give it data: only 21 of the 104 component failures in the first half of 1983 were reported to the Institute. Nevertheless, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has delegated responsibility for recording such incidents to the Institute. Report Faults Data on Nuclear Plant Mishaps, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1984, at 36, col 23. For a detailed empirical account of the actual behavior of OSHA in setting health regulations, which strongly contradicts the claim by Bardach and Kagan that it has been overly rigid and insufficiently responsive to the industry, see D. MCCAFFREY, OSHA AND THE PoLmcs OF HEALTH REGULATION (1982) . For an analysis of the ways in which courts can interpret statu- [Vol. 83:772 evitably are overinclusive (p. 25) because government can act only by means of generalizations. Furthermore, the ideology of equality before the law continually encourages the extension of rules to new settings (p. 67). In order to permit inspectors to monitor compliance, regulations must insist on simple and easily measurable proxies for the desired behavior (p. 70). These objections are sound, if hardly novel. But the authors then purport to quantify the harm caused by overinclusion and by the crudeness of the indicators of compliance. First, they assert, without any evidence, that about eighty percent of all businesses either already have attained the goals that regulation seeks or will conform to rules without any inspections or sanctions (pp. 65-66) . 24 For such enterprises, regulation is wasted effort and may be seriously counterproductive. Second, Bardach and Kagan blame regulatory unreasonableness on the inspectors themselves. They are excessively theoretical, insufficiently disciplined by experience (pp. 154-55), hypersensitive to risk (p. 82), inattentive to the costs of compliance (pp. 154-55) , and more concerned with winning cases than solving problems (pp. 79-80) . 25 Once again the authors conclude these generalizations (which undoubtedly are true of some inspectors some of the time) with a wholly unsupported estimate of their significance: "clashes between the official and the civilian perspectives" are "common indeed"; the absolute number is "very high" (p. 79). This seems sharply inconsistent with the authors' earlier assertion that eighty percent of all entrepreneurs comply without any enforcement.
Bardach and Kagan supplement these unsubstantiated conclusions with what they claim are specific instances of regulatory abuse. But on inspection these prove to be nothing of the sort. The outer limits of regulatory power are presented as descriptions of the actual exercise of those powers, when the evidence in this book alone shows that such authority rarely is invoked. Bardach and Kagan maintain that "inspectors are regularly engaged in searches and seizures, often without 'probable cause' " (p. 32), and that "inspectors in some agencies are granted summary powers to impose severe restrictions ... [which] raise the possibility of misuse" (p. 32). But all the authors have shown is the "possibility of misuse," not the reality. In a chapter tendentiously entitled "Toward Toughness," they deplore the fact that regulatory agencies are authorized to seek corporate fines as high as $25-tory language so as to provide adequately specified health and safety standards, 24. A useful antidote to such polyannaism is Charles Perrow's description of the safety records of nuclear energy, the petrochemical industry, air and marine travel, dams, and mining -all highly regulated acivities. See C. PERROW, supra note 11.
25. Somehow the authors overlook the fact that inspectors only have authority to order compliance with rules; their suggestions for "solving problems" are likely to be ignored. See note 83 infra and accompanying text. 50,000 a day, to request the imprisonment or fining of corporate officers, and to impose regulatory penalties without judicial intervention (pp. 51-52). Yet their only concrete example of punishment is a large aluminum manufacturer with numerous plants who was fined a total of $25,000 for 225 citations over a period of seven years, an average of $3500 a year and $15.56 a citation (p. 4). They insist, without evidence, that small civil penalties are "troublillg even to very large corporations. "26 Yet even these mild fines rarely are imposed; the record of regulatory enforcement is actually one of extreme laxity, not rigidity. 27 26. P. 52. This is a very strange approach to punishment -the notion that the sensitivities of the offender should be taken into account. But eventually it becomes clear that Bardach and Kagan believe that entrepreneurs do nothing wrong when they violate regulations and endanger person and property:
[V]iolations often involve failure to take some precaution that only might lead to harm. 27. A random sample of23 OSHA noise violations revealed an average abatement period of two years and numerous additional extensions. P. 139. Between the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970 and 1982 there were a total of 12 criminal prosecutions, or an average of one a year, each one following the death of a worker. These prosecutions resulted in three acquittals, one hung jury, and the conviction of eight corporate defendants, seven of which pleaded either nolo contendere or guilty. Only two individual defendants were convicted, both after pleas of nolo or guilty, and both were sentenced to probation. The nine corporate defendants convicted on ten counts were fined a total of $48,500, or an average of about $5390 per defendant and $4800 per count. HEALTii POLICY 12 (1983) .
The number of OSHA inspections gradually increased from 1972 until 1976, when it dropped by a third and remained at the latter level through 1980. The number of violations cited dropped by more than half as a result. However, the average penalty per violation increased during this period from $23.40 to $192.60. W. VISCUSI, supra note 15, at 18-19. In the first year of the Reagan administration, fiscal 1981, the number of inspections declined by another 10%. Kel- [Vol. 83:772 Bardach and Kagan also deplore procedures and practices that might seem the essence of democracy to others. Under the heading of "toughness," they bemoan the fact that many statutes and judicial decisions expanded citizen-group rights to participate in the regulatory policymaking process; stipulated that agency decisions must be made in public session, after open public hearings; held that agency rulemaking decisions must be based on a publicly disclosed evidentiary record; and made agency rules appealable to the courts by almost any "aggrieved citizen. " 28 The Freedom of Information Act expands the access of citizens, including investigative reporters, to agency inspection records. [P. SS.]29
To encourage complaints, agencies are forbidden to reveal the complainant's name, and in many regulatory schemes, discrimination by the enterprise against complaints is a punishable offense. [P. ss.p 0
They also condemn mandatory labelling of packages, such as the warnings on cigarettes, characterizing it as a mechanism whereby the government forces sellers to undertake an un- In the regulation of water pollution in Britain, which Bardach and Kagan cite as a model of "reasonableness," the maximum penalties until recently were £100 for a summary conviction and £200 following an indictment in the Crown Court; these were "universally regarded by staff of all ranks as inconsequential as deterrents for all offenders except the most impecunious of farmers."
Hawkins, supra note 9, at 48; see also K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REG-ULATION AND THE SOCIAL DEFINmON OF POLLUTION (1984) (reviewed in this issue).
As an example of what toughness might mean, consider the following. Precision Specialty Metals Inc. pleaded no contest to illegally dumping 4000 gallons per day of hexavalent chromium, a carcinogenic waste, and corrosives into city and county sewer systems in Los Angeles. The prosecutor maintained that the dumping was willful, as evidenced by the company's action in building a second illegal discharge system when it believed that the first had been discovered. The penalty was $325,000 in fines, of which $25,000 will defray the cost of hauling away contaminated soil and $250,000 will reimburse the city and county for the cost of cleanup. The company's vice president was sentenced to 120 days in jail, to be served on nights and weekends to allow him to keep his job. The plant manager was required to perform 1000 hours of community service. And the company was required to spend $34,410 to buy a full page advertisement in the Finally Bardach and Kagan criticize the ''potential for abuse" of the right of workers to refuse highly dangerous work, suggesting that "it could lead to considerable labor-management-OSHA conflict" (p. 230). 32 And they note with concern that safety stewards in Sweden have the power to halt production "on any machine or assignment they consider unsafe" 33 -ignoring evidence that this power rarely is invoked and certainly is not misused. 34 On the basis of these unproven assertions that regulatory power leads to abuse, Bardach and Kagan conclude that "the formalized statements of general normative beliefs incorporated in legal regulations by the institutions of the state may not correspond closely to the norms of social responsibility found in society." 35 In other words, although the regulatory regime was enacted by Congress, Bardach and Kagan argue that it does not deserve respect because it deviates from "norms of social responsibility" -although once again they offer no evidence for the content of these norms, who holds them, or how they deviate from the regulations.
But although Bardach and Kagan attack regulation for causing inefficiency in the form of inspections, record keeping, and dysfunctional precautions, they are even more critical of the tendency they attribute to regulation to undermine the responsibility of the "trusteeship stratum" (pp. 28-29, 321-23) . This notion, though barely described, appears to be the keystone of the "well-ordered society," in which individuals whose roles should entitle them to respect wield paternalistic authority. Examples include the safety engineer, the university administrator, the marine biologist, the plant foreman, "teachers, doctors, hospital administrators, factory food inspectors, plant managers, fire chiefs, auditors, journalists, public school principals, city planners, nurses, presidents of large corporations, nuclear safety engineers, 31. I wonder how Bardach and Kagan would feel about grants by the U.S. Department of Energy to private groups that promote nuclear energy, or expenditures of more than $25 million for the same purpose by private utilities. See C. PERROW, supra note 11, at 350. In both instances government forces taxpayers and consumers to pay for corporate propaganda with which many of them disagree strongly.
32. P. 230 (emphasis added). Of course, Bardach and Kagan offer no evidence of abuse. Furthermore, they totally fail to consider the normative issue: should workers be compelled to accept extreme danger by the threat of being fired for refusing to work? See note 126 infra and accompanying text.
33. P. 231 (footnote omitted).
34. See Fleischauer, supra note 9, at 311 n.157 (work stoppages dropped from 167 in 1978 and 171 in 1979 to 99 in 1980); Kelman, supra note 27, at 115 (anecdotal evidence suggests that the power is invoked 100 times a year, but its significance is largely symbolic); Stearns, Fact and Fiction of a Model Enforcement Bureaucracy: The Labour Inspectorate of Sweden. 6 BRIT. J.L. & SOCY. 1, 14-18 (1979) .
35. P. 319 (emphasis added).
[ Vol. 83:772 lawyers, and so on" (p. 322). What are we to make of such a hodgepodge? What do nurses and nuclear safety engineers, fire chiefs and presidents of large corporations have in common? Bardach and Kagan are not simply confused, though they may be incoherent. The underlying unity is revealed in their assertion that these people are "the cultural carriers of the idea of responsibility" (p. 322), which they define as "doing what one judges to be right in a problematic situation involving someone else's welfare." 36 Members of the "trusteeship stratum" are accustomed to exercising authority, to having their opinions respected: nurses dominate patients, foremen command workers, fire chiefs decide whom to hire, and so on. Regulation challenges this authority. Thus, "[a]n instance of regulatory unreasonableness can ... be experienced as an instance of government-imposed injustice" (p. 28). Such experiences are "infuriating," and the result may be "the erosion of self-confidence and morale on the part of the private trusteeship stratum" (pp. 28-29).
To put the matter somewhat more systematically: injustice is not inflicted by the powerful on the weak -bosses compelling workers to endure unsafe conditions, employers engaging in racial discrimination, industry polluting our environment, producers endangering consumers. Rather, injustice is inflicted on the powerful by the weak when their governmental surrogates (regulators) seek to compel the powerful to obey the law. What corporations "experience" as injustice is assumed to be injustice -the clearest possible indication that the authors are apologists for capital. The powerful are accustomed to command; governmental challenges to their authority undermine their "generalized commitment ... 'to comply with the law'" (p. 113), which cannot have been very strong. Threats of nullification are invoked by the powerful every time the powerless attempt to curtail their "prerogatives" or to limit their "discretion." Such threats were invoked by the slave states before the Civil War and by the champions of segregation during the civil rights movement and are being renewed today in the form of capital flight and runaway plants in response to demands by workers, consumers, and environmentalists.
If regulation is not th~ solution but the problem, what is the solution? First, we should place more reliance on those familiar alternatives, the market and liability rules (pp. 9-11, 60-61). The authors attribute market failure to lack of information.
Information that affects the decisions of even a small number of individuals can exert large pressures on producers, since the mechanisms of the marketplace make producers especially sensitive to changes in the marginal demand for their products or for jobs in their workplaces. Yet Bardach and Kagan do not support government intervention to 36. P. 321 (emphasis added). ensure adequate information. 37 First, they maintain that the market already offers sufficient incentives to entrepreneurs to disseminate safety information: "[m]anufacturers who want to make safety a selling point will go to some lengths to advertise this feature" (p. 250). Few manufacturers seem to find safety an effective "selling point," however, for it hardly figures prominently in their advertising. The problem, of course, is that advertising one's own safety or the dangers of a competing product or service simultaneously alerts consumers and workers to risk. 38 Second, the authors claim that people already have as much information as they want. The assumption that " [ w ] e are awash in a sea of ignorance and therefore vulnerable to any and every predatory move by producer and employer interests . . . is almost surely further from the truth" than the assumption that "[t]he marketplace plus word-of-mouth communication channels probably manage to supply nearly all the information needs and wants of nearly all the citizenry; hence there is not much left of general interest for mandatory disclosures to disclose" (p. 249). The authors offer no empirical evidence for this extraordinary conclusion. 39 Third, information only causes trouble, because its intended beneficiaries do not know how to use it: "dramatically stated blanket warning labels on drums of solvents containing substances such as benzene often get workers upset and reluctant to use them, even though no hazard is A National Academy of Sciences study in 1984 found that we have adequate information about the hazards of only 10% of 3350 pesticide ingredients, 2% of 3410 cosmetics ingredients, 18% of 1815 pharmaceuticals, 5% of 8627 food additives, and 11 % of 12,860 other commercial chemicals with sales of at least a million pounds a year. Salpukas, A Three Mile Island for Chemicals, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1984, at sec. 3, col. 3. 38. Bardach and Kagan "demonstrate" the incentive to warn by reference to Volvo's advertisements. P. 250. But what would they make of the deliberate decision by the world's second largest automobile manufacturer, the Ford Motor Company, to hide the design defect in the Pinto? See note 46 infra and accompanying text. For a dramatic account of the extraordinary lengths to which Japanese automobile manufacturers went in order to conceal dangers and the obstacles encountered by the campaign to force disclosure and obtain regulation, see Otake, Corporate Power in Social Conflict: Vehicle Safety and Japanese Motor Manufacturers, 10 INTI.. J.
Soc. L. 75 (1982).
Even when consumers do change their preferences in response to perceived risk, they often are responding to the actions of regulators and courts, and the level of safety secured remains unacceptable. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. manufactures Bendectin, a drug that claims to alleviate morning sickness. More than 33 million prescriptions have been written since the FDA approved it in 1956. Recently the drug has been blamed for birth deformities. Some 600 lawsuits have been filed. Sales ofBendectin dropped from 3.4 million prescriptions in 1979 to 1.9 million in 1981. 400 Suits Against Drug Firm to Be Heard by 1 Jury, L.A. Times, June 11, 1984, § 1, at 3, col. 4 . But this decline was caused by the lawsuits, which publicized the alleged link. Furthermore, if the charge is true, should Merrell Dow have continued to sell at the 1981 rate of 1.9 million prescriptions a year?
39. For poignant testimony that workers want more information than they receive, see notes 96-97, 101-02 infra and accompanying text. For an eloquent moral defense of that demand, see M. GIBSON, WORKERS' RIGHTS 28-56 (1983) .
[Vol. 83:772 posed under the circumstances ... " (p. 263). Hence the market works adequately even without the regulation of disclosure.
The fiction of the market as the guarantor of optimum safety has been exploded so often 40 that I will limit my criticisms to the inconsistencies within this book. Bardach and Kagan acknowledge that information often is withheld until the consumer already is hooked (p. 245). They contradict their claim that mandatory disclosure can exert large pressures on producers: because "disclosure policies may directly affect only a small percentage of the consumers and workers whose interests are to be protected. . . . regulated enterprises may not take their disclosure obligations very seriously; they may treat noncompliance as a 'mere technical' violation" (p. 266). The authors systematically confuse workers with consumers and real choices (such as how to spend leisure time) with highly constrained behavior (habitual use of tobacco or alcohol, driving to work, residing in a polluted environment).41 In the end, they seem less concerned that the market work than that its participants believe it is doing so:
Although there is no conclusive evidence that the [Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934] have prevented fraud and price manipulation . . . they seem to have bolstered the widespread belief that the SEC is an effective antifraud enforcer, and this belief has probably contributed to the pool of social trust necessary to maintain a healthy commercial system. 42 If the market is the first line of defense against danger, liability rules should be the principal backup system. Bardach and Kagan make all the usual mistakes in exaggerating the efficacy of liability rules as a deterrent. By conceding that "the liability system probably does not in fact force all enterprises to 'internalize' all the social costs" (p. 273), they strongly suggest that liability rules do internalize most such costs. But the opposite is true. Repeated empirical studies over the last half century have shown that liability rules internalize hardly any of the accident costs of entrepreneurial activity4 3 and have only the most problematic effect on behavior. 44 45. Pp. 60-61. I have argued elsewhere that large tort judgments perform the symbolic function of creating the impression that liability rules overcompensate victims, when they do just the opposite. Abel, supra note 40, at 207. To the extent that such judgments have any effect, they direct the concern of entrepreneurs to catastrophes rather than the routine carelessness that causes the vast majority of injuries and illnesses, see note 89 infra and accompanying text, and they encourage entrepreneurs to avoid liability, not risk. Abel, supra note 40, at 204. If managers are aware of multimillion dollar awards, they also may know that most tort judgments are very small: half of the plaintiffs' awards in one study were under $8000. M. PETERSON & G. It is hard to sustain a belief in the efficacy of tort liability as a control mechanism in light of the staggering risks capitalists have inflicted in their drive for profits. In the early l 970's, A.H. Robins Company manufactured and sold 2.5 million Dalkon Shields, which have been held re· sponsible for pelvic inflammation, miscarriages, sterility, and death. A former Robins quality control supervisor has testified that he told the company that the design was flawed as early as the summer of 1971. But the company notified the FDA of the problem only in 1973. In mid· 1974, at the FDA's request, Robins ceased production and wrote to all doctors, hospitals, and birth control organizations. Yet only in 1980 did Robins recommend to doctors that they re· move the shield from women still using it. The FDA did not get around to issuing such a recommendation until August, 1983 . Finally, in October, 1984 , Robins began a recall campaign directed to women through television commercials and newspaper advertisements. Why the slow response? Apparently because Robins thought it could beat the rap. But by September, 1984, more than 10,000 claims had been filed. Of the 36 that had gone to trial by March, 1984, Robins had won 19 and lost 17. In at least one case a jury verdict for 13 plaintiffs was reversed by a federal district judge on the ground that the women were more at fault for using the device than the manufacturer was for selling it. The defendant's strategy had been to divide the plaintiffs, requiring each to sue separately, and to stall endlessly in response to requests for documents. This was successful until Miles Lord, Chief Judge of the District of Minnesota, compelled the defendant to produce documents that revealed detailed knowledge of the danger by high corporate officials, exposing Robins to the threat of punitive damages not covered by their insurance. By the end of September, 1984, Robins had paid $244.7 million to settle 7,600 lawsuits, and another 3,768 claims and cases still were pending. In November, 1984, 198 49 Yet Bardach and Kagan downplay the weaknesses of the liability regime (pp. 277-82). Indeed, they think it too severe. They deplore the fact that patients overcame the professional conspiracy of silence protecting physicians from malpractice liability, they raise the spectre of "defensive medicine," and they applaud the new limitations on malpractice liability and damages -limitations that prevent tort claims from acting as effective deterrents to physician negligence (pp. 283-87). so They misstate the effect of statutory rules on the determination ofliability and urge "limits on the impulses of juries" (p. 289). 51 , 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) .
Another recent limitation on ''.jury discretion" was the grant of sovereign immunity to government contractors sued by civilians injured by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests. Ten victims won a total of $2.66 million in May, 1984. But recent legislation converts all pending and future suits against an atomic test contractor into suits against the federal government. Such suits must be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which allows no jury trial and no punitive damages. New Act Restricts Atomic Test Suits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1984, at 26, col. 1. It is not clear whether this law also will affect suits like that won by the widow of an employee of the Department of Energy at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant, who convinced a court that her husband had died of cancer caused by handling radioactive materials for 15 years, even though his exposure was within federal limits. Compensation Ordered in Atomic Worker's Death, L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1984, § l, at 7, col. 4. 51. Juries do not seem very impulsive. A major study of Chicago jury verdicts in tort cases [Vol. 83:772 endorse a Republican bill "to make product liability rules more moderate and uniform" (p. 287) but fail to disclose that the bill would obstruct, and often prevent, recovery by injured consumers, nullifying the deterrent effect of products liability law. 52 And they resort to the customary charge that many accidents "can more easily and inexpensively be avoided by the relevant class of plaintiffs," who therefore must be denied recovery in order to motivate them to adequate concern for their own safety (pp. 286-87). Having supported a number of legislative changes in tort liability rules that have been sought or secured by defendant lobbies (physicians, insurers, chambers of commerce), Bardach and Kagan hypocritically praise such rules as "better shielded from the political and bureaucratic pressures that often make direct regulation unreasonably rigid" (p. 271). Bardach and Kagan clearly believe that the best government is that which governs least: "[u]nder many conditions, we might simply wish to opt for no regulation at all" (p. 304). They accept liability rules and mandatory disclosure only to the extent that these may forestall direct regulation (p. 290). Furthermore, they are confident that technological progress and economic growth, far from increasing the need for regulation, actually diminish it: "Richer is safer," wrote Aaron Wildavsky, and it is true that if we simply encourage plant modernization through economic incentives, many aspects of product and worker safety and environmental protection will continue to improve. [P. 304.] Aware that the victims of risk -workers, consumers, and all those affected by environmental degradation -favor greater regulation, they disregard that broad consensus: "If the costs . . . of prevention are very much in excess of benefits, and ifthere are no overriding egalitarian or paternalistic considerations to offset this imbalance, then one might reasonably say that more mandated prevention was socially irresponsible. " 53 In order to justify substituting their own judgment for between 1960 and 1979 found that half of all claims were for less than $900 in medical expenses and less than $1200 in lost earnings (in 1979 dollars), and half of all awards were less than $7800 in toto. M. PETERSON, CoMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY 11-13 (1984) . Jury awards were closely related to both medical expenses and lost earningsitems not easily manipulated. Id. at 26. Severity of injuries had little effect on the likelihood of success. Id. at 41. Nor have awards been growing faster than inflation. Id. at 46. The major increase in compensation for medical expenses in catastrophic injuries appears to reflect new capacities for heroic intervention. Id. at 50-51.
52. The Kasten Bill (Product Liability Act, S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)) would override all state laws governing liability for defective products and preempt that subject entirely. It would replace strict liability with negligence, shift the burden of proof to plaintiffs where some state laws had placed the burden of disproof on defendants, eliminate the doctrine of collateral estoppel (thereby requiring every victim of an identical product to establish independently that the product was unreasonably dangerous), preclude liability where the defect is obvious, introduce the defense of comparative fault on the part of the user or consumer, and reduce damages for work injuries by the amount to which the victim would be entitled under workers' compensation.
53. P. 320 (emphasis added).
that of democratic politics, they invoke the scientism of "independent" cost-benefit analysis (p. 312). 54 And they urge that both the promulgation and enforcement of regulations be shielded from the influence of victims, though not of those who victimize them. 5 5 The authors propose a number of regulatory reforms to promote these ends. First, they wish to diminish the power of victims. Workers should ask the company to improve safety rather than demand compliance with OSHA rules or threaten inspections and sanctions (pp. 107-09). 56 Inspectors should not waste their time responding to worker complaints, and when the agency must do so it should use less experienced inspectors. 57 When inspectors visit plants they should "spend proportionately more time talking with managers and professionals in the regulated enterprise and interviewing operating employees" and "proportionately less time looking at physical facilities in search of violations. " 58 Bardach and Kagan would expand the role of the union as intermediary between workers and managers because "[r]outing complaints through the union safety specialists ... seems to cut down on unreasonable employee complaints" (p. 232). The reasons are not hard to find.
A full-time labor union safety representative in a large factory said that he often tours the plant at break time to look for safety problems so that he can avoid getting bogged down with "piddling complaints" from workers and concentrate on things he thinks are most important. Moreover, he says, it hurts his credibility with company engineers when he is obliged to bring up minor problems raised by workers. 59 As a result, "the worker or his representative has some clout," and there is "worker-management consultation over safety issues." 60 Such deference by workers to union officials and management is consistent 54. For a critique of the "independence" of cost-benefit analysis in "professional judgment," see B. FISCHHOFF, s. LICHTENSTEIN 60. P. 230 (emphasis added). [Vol. 83:772 with the authors' belief that the workplace contains no irreconcilable structural conflicts. The authors' second proposal is regulation by the "good inspector," who might better be called the "nice inspector," for he is accommodating rather than principled. 61 This inspector does not invoke legal powers but instead relies on "elements of exchange -responsiveness, forebearance, and information" to secure behavioral changes in the industry. 62 He looks for basic problems rather than rule violations (p. 102). He does not insist upon engineering controls to enhance safety and recommends their introduction only as equipment is replaced for purposes of modernizing production. 63 If the inspectors' attitude and modus operandi are to change, they must gain greater technical competence: not more academic education but more experience with the regulated industry in order to make them more "reasonable" (pp. 128, 155). They also should become more specialized, because, "on balance, the potential gains from specialization, in terms of both effectiveness and reasonableness, would probably be larger" than the "improved perception and renewed toughness" that come from rotating inspectors. 64 To increase experience it is necessary to reduce turnover; we can do this by offering inspectors continuing education, even though the starting salary of an OSHA inspector in the 1970's was $10,507 and the ceiling was $19,263 (p. 156 n.11). On the other hand, there is no need to increase the number of inspectors, although each OSHA inspector was responsible for 1515 sites in 1980: "seemingly low budgets may actually be close to some optimum . . .
[because] the preponderance of regulated enterprises usually are good apples." 65 Finally, it is essential to dampen the "zeal" and "self- aggrandizement" of the agencies themselves (p. 309). The authors urge that every regulatory advisory board create a seat for an economist, who can be counted on to favor industry (p. 312). And they recommend that agencies be "obliged periodically to decrease the compliance costs of existing regulations by some percentage, say 5-10 percent every three or four years." 66 But workers will continue to complain even if no one listens, and even the most industry-oriented agency may enforce some rules. The ultimate solution, then, is to hand regulation over to the industries themselves. 67 The justification for doing so is the authors' belief that capital's concern for worker and consumer safety and environmental protection varies with the character of the enterprise -there are good apples and bad. The primary goal, therefore, must be to identify and influence the good apples, to "affect the consciousness, organization, or culture of the regulated enterprise by "training . . . middle-and lower-level personnel" to be more "sensitive" to concerns that otherwise would amplify the demand for external regulation. 68 The organizational solution is to appoint "full-time quality assurance specialists 'who sit equally on the organizational chart with production and sales ing and construction establishment only once every ten years. M. MACCARTHY, supra note 27, at 12. In the first three years of the Reagan administration, a third of OSHA field offices were closed, and the number of inspectors dropped by a third, worksite inspections by 16%, follow-up inspections by 88%, and hours spent on health and safety inspections by 20-25%. See Testimony of Margaret Seminario, Associate Director, Department of Occupational Safety, Health and Social Security, AFL-CIO, before the House Committee on Government Operations Subcommittee on Manpower and Housing, Nov. 3, 1983, quoted in L. Stearns, supra note 27, at 5.
In California, Cal-OSHA staff has been cut 20% as a result of a reduced budget and a hiring freeze imposed by Governor Deukmejian. The legal department, charged with enforcement, has been cut from 13 lawyers to 4, and the state attorney general's office has refused to defend Cal-OSHA when employers challenge penalties. The right-to-know law is not being enforced; although 20,000 information sheets on potentially dangerous chemicals have been submitted by manufacturers and employers, 21 additional employee years would be required to go through them and ascertain if they were in compliance. Jacobs, Cal-OSHA Comes to a Crossroads, L.A. Times, Dec. 5, 1983, § 1, at 3, col. 4; Jacobs, Legislators Rap 'Gutting' of Worker Safety Programs, L.A. Times, Dec. 9, 1983, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
The parallels with nineteenth-century England are striking. In 1835, 11 inspectors and subinspectors were responsible for 4,000 factories employing more than 350,000 workers; a quartercentury later half again as many staff had to inspect 6,378 factories and more than twice as many employees. [ Vol. 83:772 ... [and whose] words are as important as those of the production manager' " (pp. . It also may be useful to appoint a public director to the board of the corporation "to oversee programs designed to ensure good faith compliance with regulation . . . . " 69 Once the "consciousness, culture, and organization" of the enterprise has been professionalized in this fashion, it will be possible to turn over the task of regulation to the enterprise itself, for "[t]he best-developed social expression of self-regulation is the ethic of professionalism."7° Yet there is no reason to believe that self-regulation by industry will be any more effective than self-regulation by the professions. 71 Bardach and Kagan nonetheless urge a return to industry ·responsibility for setting the standards by which they should operate (p. 217), even though the inadequacy of these standards was one of the reasons for the creation of OSHA, 72 and the authors acknowledge that encouraging trade associations to formulate and police rules accelerates cartelization of an industry (pp. .
Bardach and Kagan are selective in their search for evidenceinterviewing managers but not workers -and undaunted by the absence of evidence when they leap to conclusions. They consistently present "might be" as "is." They portray the world as harmonious but for workers who misperceive their own best interests and regulators who possess flawed characters or are carried away by youthful inexperience. Their capitalists are reasonable and well-intentioned but misunderstood and reviled. Misguided efforts to coerce them will just get their backs up and undermine the responsibility of the "trusteeship stratum." They must exercise authority, and they will do so benignly if only they are left alone.
II. RISKY BUSINESS
In The Other Price of Britain's Oil, W.G. Carson returns our attention to where it belongs -to those who inflict risk on others and the 69. P. 227. The authors seem to believe that corporate organization charts determine power rather than reflect it. 70. P. 316. A striking instance of the refusal of corporations to accept, or even to consider, conservation measures that actually served their self-interest is the battle between the Environmental Defense Fund and Pacific Gas and Electric. It took several years and four lawsuits to compel P.G.& E. to adopt the innovations. When a senior attorney for E.D.F. asked a senior vice president of the company whether it would have been possible to persuade P.G.& E. of the desirability of the idea through less adversarial means, the latter replied: "There was no confidence in your motives. If you had published [the idea] you would have had to invent an E.D.F. to push it. An interesting book is not going to tum any large institution around." Roe, How to Mold the Nation's Utilities: Building Profits into Conservation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, § 3, at 2, col. 3 ; see also D. ROE, DYNAMOS AND VIRGINS 197-200 (1984 79-91 (1978) .
nature and magnitude of the risks they create. This superb case study of the dangers of exploring and producing North Sea oil demonstrates that the legal framework of regulation always was inadequate, that the regulatory agency was underfunded and structured in a way that facilitated capture by the industry, that the latter consistently, unreasonably, and successfully resisted safety precautions and opposed enforcement procedures, and that the·penalties it incurred were laughable and ineffective. It is a sorry story of the failure of regulation in the real world -an invaluable antidote to the myth of oppressive regulation purveyed by Bardach and Kagan. Carson begins by situating the phenomenon of risk within the political economy of the industry that generates it. The injuries and deaths suffered by workers on North Sea oil rigs were caused by the decisions of multinational oil corporations and the British state, which benefitted from them. Carson explains these choices through a rich description of the political and economic environment of the 1960's. The feverish search for oil and gas -a constant throughout much of the last half century -was intensified in Britain during this decade by its accelerated industrial decline (p. 86), its need to redress the disastrous balance of payments, the government's determination to defend the pound from devaluation (p. 88), and anxieties about the cost and reliability of other energy sources after the formation of OPEC in 1960 (p. 90). The discovery of North Sea oil seemed an almost miraculous solution to these intractable problems: it quickly reversed the balance of payments (p. 108), and tax revenues (supplemented by royalties once the British National Oil Corporation was created) provided income desperately needed by the rapidly expanding welfare state, especially during the 1973-1974 recession (p. 114) . But the urgent need of the British state to reap these benefits meant that the leases and royalty agreements it negotiate9. with the major oil companies were not nearly as attractive as they might have been had the demand for revenue been less pressing (pp. 99-101) , and the government was forced to rely on North American sources for capital (pp. 122-25) and on the industry for technology (pp. 125-26) . The result was a relationship of dependency, similar to that which prevails between third-world states and multinational corporations (pp. 116-17) .
These same political economic variables determined the extraordinary risks to which workers on the North Sea oil installations were exposed. 73 Even when one excludes the uniquely treacherous diving operations, the exploration and production of offshore oil was the most dangerous industry in Britain at the time (pp. 21, 23-24) .
Apologists for the industry typically attributed these dangers to the hostile environment -injuries and deaths were the necessary, if tragic, price demanded by a vital resource (pp. 42-45) . 74 This view also maintained that work on the oil rigs attracted risk-preferential types, derogatorily termed "cowboys," who were neglectful of their own safety and actually enjoyed confronting danger (p. 45). 75 But Carson shows that, although the environment undoubtedly was difficult and the workers were drawn by high salaries, injuries and deaths actually were caused by something much more mundane. Most accidents were the result of hazardous working conditions deliberately and consciously created by managers in order to maximize profit. (Yes, even nationalized industries competing within a capitalist economy obey such an imperative.) Workers were exposed to extremes of fatigue, cold, hunger, and boredom during their twelve-hour days and fourteen-day tours of duty on the oil rigs (pp. 72-73) . 76 Moreover, partly because of these harsh conditions, turnover was very high -as many as forty percent of each new shift were wholly inexperienced (p. 74). 77 There were constant pressures to maintain production at all costs (pp. 74-75). Workers were reluctant to insist on safety precautions, both because they thought such requests would be ignored and because they feared retaliation (p. 76). 7 8 This disregard for safety is reflected in the accident statistics. An internal company survey revealed that half of all injuries were caused by "falling, slipping or tripping" (p. 49). Carson's own analysis of the 229 fatal and serious accidents between 1975 and 1978 showed that thirty percent were falls and twenty-five percent were the result of crushing. Moreover, the industry failed to report or correct known problems until an accident had occurred (pp. 53, 58, 172) . 79 A review of sixty-six fatal, serious, or dangerous accidents attributed sixty-four 74. This sort of apology is hardly new. Consider the reasoning of a famous nineteenth·cen-tury American case that denied compensation to the owner of buildings destroyed when a steamboiler on a neighbor's property exploded and was catapulted onto his land:
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender by every other man of the same rights, and the security, advantage and protection which the laws give me. So, too, the general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed use and possession of my real estate . . • are much modified by the exigencies of the social state. We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873 percent of them to human error (p. 171). Equally correctable errors seem to explain the Alexander Kielland tragedy, in which 123 men were killed on a Norwegian oil platform (p. 288). And the inadequacy of the regulatory scheme must accept partial responsibility for the poor safety record of North Sea oil. Both industry resistance and regulatory failings were products of the dominant role played by private capital and of the political pressures for rapid production. 80 Although exploration of North Sea oil was well advanced by 1963, there was no statutory framework for regulating the industry until the end of the decade. During the 1960's, the only regulatory device available to government was the draconian sanction of license suspension, which, precisely because of its severity, never was used (p. 148). 81 It took a full five years after the Sea Gem disaster of 1965, in which thirteen men were killed, before the necessary legislation was enacted; during that time another fourteen men died (p. 150). Even then, another seven years had passed before the government implemented this legislation (p. 157). Much of the thirteen-year delay was attributable to the government's desire to "carry the industry with us" -to achieve that cooperative relationship between regulator and regulated so highly valued by Bardach and Kagan (p. 152) . 82 The industry exacted a high price in human life and suffering in return for its dilatory and reluctant cooperation. The legal framework ultimately constructed never was adequate. There were major lacunae: regulation of the construction stage, of the "flotels" in which workers lived, and of the pipelines all were omitted (p. 235). Overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions among governmental bodies caused delays and oversights (pp. 264-65) . And because of the industry's novelty and the rate of technological change, regulations were drafted in very general terms and supplemented by "guidance notes," a scheme that allowed precisely the flexibility touted by Bardach and Kagan (p. 178). Unfortunately, it also made the ·regulations legally unenforceable and permitted the industry to ignore them. 83 The administrative structure also reflected the pressures for production. The government had to choose between a horizontal framework, in which a specialized safety agency regulated many disparate industries, and a vertical framework, in which the government agency responsible for promoting oil production also controlled safety (pp. 159-60). In concrete terms, this was a choice between extending the jurisdiction of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which already regulated mining, agriculture, and nuclear energy among other industries, or giving responsibility to the Petroleum Engineering Division of the Department of Energy (PED) (pp. 187-92). The latter argued that it could move more quickly, keeping pace with a rapidly changing technology, whereas the HSE was too slow and bureaucratic (pp. 202-03) . Ultimately, the PED won the jurisdictional battle (p. 290). The price, of course, was subordinating safety to production -precisely the "reasonableness" and concern for the costs of regulation that Bardach and Kagan champion (pp. 163-66 ). Yet even with the expertise the PED acquired through its production responsibilities, it had to rely on the industry for technical information and was hampered by the secrecy that competition engendered (p. 171). The PED was grossly understaffed: the first inspector was appointed in 1966, the second in 1968, and the third in 1971 (p. 172). 84 Whereas HSE inspectors were recruited from a broad background, trained on the job, rotated every five years to avoid excessive identification with the regulated, and often spent their entire careers in the agency, most PED inspectors were drawn from the industry and returned to it after a brief stint in government (pp. 174, 205) . 85 Another set of structural factors limited regulatory efficacy. The private companies involved in oil exploration and production soon formed a trade association to negotiate safety matters collectively (p. 181). But workers remained unorganized. By the end of 1977, unions had gained recognition on only six of the twenty-eight rigs; three years later less than twenty percent of the work force was organized (p. 213). 86 The explanations for this poor showing include jurisdictional bickering among unions, a transient workforce enjoying high wages, and of course the isolation of the oil rigs (pp. 214-15). 87 But much of it must be attributed to vigorous opposition from employers, who often denied organizers access to the installations (p. 217). The low level of unionization, in tum, was one reason for the failure of the HSE to gain responsibility for regulation (p. 223). And the PED, unlike the HSE, made no effort to consult with unions, nor did its enabling legislation provide for union safety representatives or committees (pp. 213, 222 86. This figure is very low for British industry, although it is average for American. 87. A deckhand told Nelkin and Brown: "Regulating ships at sea is nearly impossible. The captain is the boss, and there is no authority beyond the captain. That's it." D. NELKIN & M.
BROWN, WORKERS AT R.lsK, infra Part III, at 128. 88. Too much should not be expected from safety representatives. Interviews with those These inadequacies in the regulatory framework reappeared in its actual operations. The PED, like the industry itself, was preoccupied with the fear of a major catastrophe such as the Sea Gem or Alexander Kielland, which could have unpredictable political consequences; the industry and the regulators both tended to ignore the routine carelessness that caused most accidents and injuries (pp. 176, 241) . 89 Inspectors were hampered by the need to give advance notice of visits to offshore rigs (p. 239). 90 Inspections were ·conducted and safety instructions were drafted without reference to legal authority and therefore failed to lay a sufficient foundation for subsequent prosecution (pp. 246-47). Indeed, the PED criticized the HSE's tendency to look for violations and to measure regulatory efficacy by the number of prosecutions (p. 249). The PED's determination to accelerate production led it to issue certificates of fitness permitting drilling and production before construction was complete (p. 243). Because of uncertainty about the jurisdiction of Scottish courts over offshore installations, all Fatal Injury Inquiries were suspended until new enabling legislation could be passed in 1976; although the latter explicitly was made retroactive, none of the intervening deaths was investigated (pp. 262-63).
If regulatory authorities exercised their powers cautiously, the industry was not timid about resisting. Companies incorporated in the United States vigorously contested the jurisdiction of British agencies and courts (pp. 237-38). 91 And both American and British companies sought to avoid civil and criminal liability by constructing a complicated web of employment contracts with subcontractors and by invoking the statute of limitations after stalling off claims (pp. 269, 275, 278) .
The combination of passive regulators and an obstructionist industry produced the inevitable results. In the years 1978-1980, there were only thirteen prosecutions (pp. 249-50). Six were filed under earlier legislation, five of which resulted in acquittals, and two-thirds of the defendants in the sixth were found not guilty. Less than half of all the appointed under the Health and Safety at Work Act elicited pessimistic evaluations of their efficacy: "The management lets you know what they want you to know"; "we're still treated like mushrooms -kept in the dark and fed with rubbish." L. Stearns, From Promise to Action: A Case Study in the Role of Subordinate Legislation 24-25 (unpublished 1982) .
89. This fear of political exposure affects all regulatory agencies and may explain why prosecutions tend to follow deaths or serious injuries -the agency wants to show that it has not been caught napping, when obviously it has. Throughout the 1950's the British Chief Inspector of Factories initiated two-thirds to four-fifths of all its prosecutions with respect to machinery following an accident. Veljanovski, Regulatory Enforcement: An Economic Study of the British Factory Inspectorate, 5 LAW & POLY. Q. 75, 90-91 (1983) . We have seen already that all criminal prosecutions under OSHA followed deaths at work. See note 27 supra.
90. Bardach and Kagan deplore unannounced inspections, p. 106; workers believe that notice to employers nullifies the value of the inspection. See notes 122-23 infra and accompanying text.
91. It is worth noting that resistance was not a reaction to unreasonable regulation but opposition to any regulation. defendants (10 out of 23) were found guilty (8 after pleas, 2 after trial). Of these, one was admonished, and nine were fined amounts between £25 and £400-an average of £214 each (pp. 267-68). Such leniency in an industry whose annual earnings were in the billions of pounds dramatically illustrates the conventionalization of crime (p. 231). 92 Nor did regulatory agencies make use of their extrajudicial powers: they "very rarely" closed down an installation for violating regulations and instead granted temporary exemptions or issued partial certificates (pp. 251-52).
The Petroleum Engineering Division of the British Department of Energy is the "good inspector" lauded by Bardach and Kagan. It is a model of "reasonableness." It is at least as concerned with production and with industry costs as with safety. Many of its inspectors have had experience within the industry, and many look forward to future employment there. The PED administers a regime of legislation and regulations formulated in cooperation with the industry. It rarely prosecutes violations, and even then it can seek only trivial sanctions. It refrains from using its summary powers.
This reasonable regulatory regime oversees the industry with the worst safety record in the country. The injuries and deaths it condones are caused by carelessness, overwork, inexperience and haste, not by technological limits or an ungovernable environment. Both the regulatory regime and the industry reflect the political economy within which they operate: the market for oil, the structure of producers, the distribution and control of other energy reserves, the vulnerability of the British economy, the exigencies of the Tory Government, and the weakness of labor. It is these factors, not the character of regulatory personnel, that produce the risk and determine the nature of the regulatory response. Carson's book, in sum, is a powerful antidote to Bardach and Kagan's mystifications.
III. LISTENING TO VICTIMS
Dorothy Nelkin and Michael S. Brown provide another essential perspective ignored or distorted by Bardach and Kagan. In Workers at Risk· Voices from the Workplace, they allow seventy-five workers to speak at length about the experience of being exposed to toxic chemi- prosecutions for safety violations of the New South Wales Coal Mines Regulation Act, an aver· age of3.7 a year, of which three-quarters were successful. The maximum fine was £35, but many were much lower. During the same period, however, the state successfully prosecuted 26 miners for safety violations, and mine owners successfully initiated an average of 24 private prosecutions a year, or more than 8 times as many as the successful state prosecutions of owners. See Hopkins & Parnell, supra note 83, at 188-89.
cals. The authors make no pretense of "objectivity" or "balance." If justification for such partisanship is needed, Bishop Desmond Tutu phrased it cogently in a speech at UCLA Law School a week before he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace: if you want to know whether the noose is too tight, ask the victim, not the hangman. 93 The authors do not claim that these voices are representative, for the sample was not chosen randomly. But they do argue that "the meaning and social context of human behavior, the importance of subjective experience, and the connections between such experience and behavior" are indispensable for understanding the response to risk, and they offer this testimony as evidence of relations between consciousness and behavior that demand further exploration (p. ix). 94 In presenting these insights, I will borrow an analytic framework from an article on the transformation of disputes. 95 Workers exposed to toxic chemicals first must name the risk; next they must assign blame for it -to their employer, themselves, or simply the nature of things; and finally they must make a claim -for a lower level of risk, for control over exposure, for information, for compensation, or for some other solution. It is important to understand the factors that influence each stage in this transformation.
Naming the hazards of the workplace may be the most difficult step, for worker ignorance can foreclose any possibility of corrective action. These workers accuse their employers of withholding essential information: failing to warn of the risks associated with PCB (p. 11), methyl chloroform (pp. 38-39), and epoxy (p. 62); concealing dangers -for instance, by adding a mint smell to a toxic chemical (p. 28); refusing to allow workers to see the results of their medical examinations (pp. 19, 158); 96 obscuring long-term risks, especially of cancer 93. Charles Perrow, supra note 11, at 315-28, offers a convincing argument for taking seriously the ways in which potential victims assess risk. Furthermore, fear itself is an important phenomenon. Recent epidemiological studies show that the combination of a highly demanding job environment and low control over that environment produces stress and cardiovascular disease. Karasek, Baker, Marxer, Ahlborn & Theorell, Job Decision Latitude, Job Demands, and Cardiovascular Disease: A Prospective Study of Swedish Men, 11 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 694 (1981) REV. 631 (1980-81) .
96. In Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) , the California Supreme Court held that an employee could sue Johns-Manville in tort, even though workers' compensation generally was the exclusive rem- [Vol. 83:772 (pp. 152, 167) ; and providing safety information that is either too technical and complex or too general and incomplete, when they offer any at all (pp. 59-61, 151, 153, 156).97 Workers confess that their lack of control leads them to deny dangers and minimize risks (pp. 45, 86, 93-96): There are no options. So we keep our mouth shut. We never talk about the issue with our friends who work for the railroad. . . . And when we do mention it, they say, "Oh, you sound like those Vietnam veterans," or "Shut up, we don't want to hear it." [P. 93.] I've passed the right-to-know stuff around the shop. Two or three guys looked at it and threw it down. They say, "Hey, you're scaring me. I can't come to work anymore." [P. 95.] This reluctance to acknowledge risk appears to be associated with a wide variety of personal characteristics. Younger workers believe themselves to be indestructible, 98 self-sufficient, and capable of dispensing with union support, yet they, most of all, want to enjoy the endless life they see before them (pp. 40-41, 106, 119) .99 Older workers boast of surviving and argue that others should be able to endure similar risks; looking forward to retirement, they do not want to make waves (pp. 40, 106) . Discussions among workers are an essential part of the process by which vague personal anxieties are named as concrete risks, but men share their concerns less openly than women, both because they are less sociable and because they fear to admit weakness (pp. 34-36, 46-47) . 100 Workers who view themselves as professionals and the self-employed are much more willing to trust the judgment of employers and manufacturers (pp. 151, 166-67, 179-80 ).
Yet if some deference to employers still prevails, workers increasingly demand the right to know the risks to which they are exposed (p. 164). Worker consciousness of risk has been expanded greatly as a result of the activities of the Occupational Safety and Health Adminisedy, where the employer deliberately concealed the fact that the employee was suffering from the effects of exposure to asbestos. tration. 101 In 1969, a year before OSHA was established, only thirtyeight percent of production workers believed they were exposed to risks; eight years later the proportion had more than doubled (pp. xvxvi). But workers do not rely passively on regulatory agencies to alert them to and protect them from risk. Interaction among workers is even more important in identifying and responding to hazards. Unionized workers consistently are more aware of risk than their unorganized counterparts (p. 24). The following account clearly illustrates how discomfort is transformed from a personal failing into a collective grievance:
Residents of Love
I started working at the museum about a year ago and immediately got various ailments that I never had before. . . . I thought it was stress because I hadn't worked full time for a few years. I just explained to myself that I wasn't cut out for full-time work and was having a hard time adjusting to it. . . . Then two other people got the same kind of rash and we all worked on the same floor. That made me think that there was something in the air.
. . . I started asking everyone if they had any symptoms and found an incredible number of people on the staff with dizziness and eye problems. . . . Other people who thought they were getting hay fever now began to think that it was this chemical. We were talking one day at coffee and came up with 17 out of 42 people who work here who had mysterious rashes. [P. 36.] On the other hand, when workers constantly are moved around the plant, the interaction necessary to uncover common problems is disrupted (p. 179). Those who suffer personal illness or injury or the death of a loved one have the strongest possible incentive to pursue the search for causes and to reject easy solutions (pp. 32-33, 176) . Some workers engage in library research and even conduct their own epidemiological studies (pp. 32-34,. 49) . 102 Their findings are strikingly consistent with those of professional scientists, although workers still underestimate the chronic effects of long-term exposures (p. 31).
Once workers have named the risks that threaten them they must take the next step of attributing blame. 102. See also A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 87-94; c. VAN STRUM, A BITfER Foo 199-217 (1983) . The mother of a child who died ofleukemia initiated a community investigation of other cases in East Woburn, Massachusetts. With the help of her local pastor she uncovered six cases in the immediate neighborhood and a total of 12 in East Woburn. The Center for Disease Control estimated that the probability of six cases within a half-mile radius was .01. A subsequent epidemiological study by the chair of the biostatistics department at the Harvard School of Public Health confirmed that finding and linked the high incidence of leukemia to trichloroethylene in the local water supply. DiPema, Leukemia Strikes a Small Town, N.Y. Times Mag., Dec. 2, 1984, at 100. 103. For an interesting study of the way in which the media, government prosecution and [Vol. 83:772 risks from workers, so they also seek to blame the workers for them: 104 The company has a big safety program, but it's very superficial -they'd rather put the burden on the employee. Think safety, wear your hard hat, do this, do that. Everything is the employee's fault. [P. 64.] Employer safety precautions reflect and reinforce this attribution by focusing on employees rather than on the work environment. They prohibit smoking rather than reducing chemical fumes (p. 55). Most important, they require employees to use personal protective equipment rather than introducing engineering controls (pp. 69-70, 80 n.2). The reasons are not only the relative cost of each and their effects on· production but also the fact that subsequent failure to use protective equipment allows the employer to blame the employee. The scientific community strongly reinforced this bias until recently (pp. 50-51).
In light of this, it is not surprising that many workers do blame themselves when they suffer injury or illness.1°5
The first thing that occurs to you is that your fear is making you make up things. I have to say to myself over and over, "Seventeen people out of forty have rashes"; I have to repeat these numbers to legitimize my complaints. If I didn't know other people with those complaints I'm sure that I would have convinced myself that I was causing it by being just nervous or exhausted. People tend to blame themselves. Some become obsessed with their personal life styles, hoping to devise a charm against the danger: REv. 47 (1977) .
106. The speaker, an electrician in a chemical factory, was exposed to PGCH and suffers from asthma and severe allergic reactions. Pp. 188, 194. trial painter smoked in order to kill the odors of the chemicals that surrounded them; the painter also drank to counteract the effects of lacquer thinner fumes (p~ 27, 29-30 Yet workers acquiesce less readily in the attempt by employers to shift responsibility by insisting on personal protective equipment. They find such devices intensely uncomfortable as well as intolerable impediments to the tasks they must perform and the production norms they must meet (pp. 70-72, 76-78) . 108 Furthermore, they encounter severe social pressures against using protecive equipment: a hair stylist felt she could not wear a mask while exposing her customers to the same fumes; supervisors and even fell ow workers ridiculed those who took precautions (pp. 77-80).
Economists and employers often argue that workers must accept responsibility for risk because they choose to incur it by accepting a job. I responded above that this mystification confuses workers with consumers. 109 The latter sometimes do have real choices, as shown by the care that most producers take to protect the patrons of beauty salons but not the workers, or the audience in a theater but not the stage crew (pp. 17-18, 81) . 110 Workers occasionally do appear to make meaningful choices. A few accept risk as inherent in work they find intrinsically satisfying because they are relatively autonomous: a sculptor, a physicist, a firefighter, a rosarian, a self-employed furniture restorer, or a deckhand. In addition, at least two women derived satisfaction from having broken gender barriers: the deckhand and an industrial painter (pp. 97-99). And occasionally workers illustrate the economists' model and accept risk in exchange for higher pay (pp. 85, 165) .
But most workers incur risk because they see no alternative: all 107. Workers tend to underestimate routine risks. P. 83. See Hale & Perusse, supra note 76, at 78. 108. Like many others, I can attest to the intense discomfort and inconvenience of protective devices even when production norms are self-imposed -as in home improvement. Anyone who has tried to operate a pneumatic drill with earmuffs, or a sandblaster while wearing a hood, or applied fiberglass insulation or adhesive for floor tiles while wearing a mask will be horrified by Bardach and Kagan's suggestion that these are adequate and acceptable protections.
109. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 110. One reason for this difference is that workers are less likely to complain (because of their subordination) and can claim only workers' compensation, which pays a fraction of tort damages. Thus, an employer may be willing to expose a worker to the risk of sterilization (which causes no wage loss and therefore does not expose the employer even to liability for workers' compensation) but not to a mutagen or teratogen, which might produce a deformed child who could sue in tort. P. 146.
jobs have risks, and workers see little choice among jobs. They are lucky to have even one. I guess, I probably figure, everybody's going to get it one way or another. . . . I'm not ready to quit my job and go through all the bullshit I'd have to go through to get another job when I'm not sure whether it's killing me. . . . My field is art and whatever other job I'm gonna get it's gonna be the same. [P. 88.] . . . Jesus, it's a chemical plant and the lime's there and part of the process and no one is going to get rid of the lime. You've got to keep that plant running. So what can you do about it except make sure that everyday you put your cream on. [Pp. 31-32.] Workers stay on the job in order to qualify for pensions, and the longer they stay the harder it is to quit (pp. 88, 91). They rationalize the decision: "seeing that I had worked with [a potentially mutagenic chemical] for maybe five or six years before I knew, the damage that could be done was probably already done ... " (p. 40). They feel powerless to reduce risk: "if you refuse to do something the guy in back of you will go ahead and do it instead" (p. 92). One worker put it succinctly:
You never balance the wage against the risk; you balance the wage against the alternative. And the alternative is starving when you're put in this situation. That's what's so phony about this cost/benefit analysis. [P. 91.]lll Given the proportion of workers who do not name the risks they incur and the proportion of those who name the risk but fail to blame their employers, it is not surprising that the claim rate is so low. Half of all workers confronting danger fail to take any action whatever (p. 113). 112 Of those who do, almost all (eighty-five percent) go directly to management; only seven percent appeal to a regulatory agency, and only six percent report to their unions (p. 113).113
A number of factors contribute to this passivity. The first, and perhaps most important, is employer opposition. Workers see little to be gained by complaining when employers stall for years in making repairs (pp. 51-52, 54), wait until someone gets hurt (pp. 53, 115) , 114 disregard worker warnings (p. 59), display contempt for governmental 111. This feeling of impotence must have been aggravated during the recent recession. A Bureau of Labor Statistics report found that 5.1 million workers who had occupied their jobs for at least three years lost those positions because of plant shutdowns or staff cuts between 1979 and 1984. Two million never were reemployed, of whom 1.3 million still are looking for jobs and 700,000 have given up. Another 900,000 who found new jobs were earning less money -60% of them at least 20% less. A further 6.4 million people lost jobs they had held less than three years. OSHA wouldn't even deal with it, because they said I had to lodge a formal grievance against my employer for them even to come out to inspect. I didn't want to do that. [P. 131.] Others are embarrassed about their disabilities or concerned that these will disqualify them from work (pp. 24-25, 142 118. While misfortune sometimes evokes sympathy from others, it often stimulates uglier reactions. The residents of Love Canal were sometimes ridiculed, told that they had been fools to buy homes at Love Canal, suspected of trying to "make a bundle" from the government, accused of giving the city a bad name, sneered at for seeking publicity for its own sake, and feared as contaminated carriers of mysterious diseases. The comments and reactions stemmed not only from strangers and fellow workers but often from friends and even from relatives.
A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 185 (footnote omitted). 119. By contrast, one elderly male worker felt he could afford to lose his job. P. 129. [Vol. 83:772 examine them biased and unsympathetic (pp. 136, 139-42) . 120 And they know that employers successfully resist compensation claims: only about forty percent of worker injuries are compensated and only two to three percent of worker illnesses; in 1975 only 1.7 percent of the 1.8 million worker compensation awards were for illness (p. 137). Families may be too distraught by the death of a loved one to pursue a claim (p. 144), and employers may persuade a worker not to claim by offering an easy job during convalescence (p. 143).
If workers feel it is hopeless to seek safer conditions or compensation from their employers, they have even less faith in regulatory agencies. We have seen already that only seven percent of those who complain, and only 3.5 percent of those who encounter risk, voice their complaints to a regulator. One reason, again, is fear of employer reprisals (p. 130). But workers also perceive OSHA -the only meaningful regulatory agency -to be weak, slow, inefficacious, and a captive of the industry.
OSHA is so underfunded and understaffed that, if you waited for them to get around to you, you'd be waiting a good long time. [P. 132.] It was obvious that they [NIOSH] had no intentions of stepping on any feet in the government .... We're talking about Dioxin and therefore about the Agent Orange problem. If NIOSH came up with any disturbing statements about its effect on us, that would be like one small weak branch of the federal government sticking a dagger in the heart of the Pentagon, which is not a small weak branch of the government. 12 1
We had an OSHA inspector come. I couldn't talk to him. The vicepresident of the company followed him around everywhere. [P. 133.]1 22
OSHA inspectors come in and they look at something specific. . . .
[They] never look next door . . . . The firm can make it look good when they have to. . . . If they know it's time for an inspector to come around, they treat their people like kings. [P. 134.]1 2 3 Although workers support government regulation and would like to see OSHA strengthened (p. 128), they know that ultimately they themselves must control risk.
We have a responsibility 'to teach our children that, just because someone told you something is safe, it's not. Just because the federal governn;ient says something is okay, doesn't make it great. I don't think they have our best interests at heart. I don't trust them. Workers resist paternalism from both their employers and the government. They reject Bardach and Kagan's proposal that a "trusteeship stratum" should have "responsibility" for their lives. They demand the right to know, confident that they possess the necessary expertise to evaluate and use such knowledge, 1 25 and they insist on nothing less than autonomy -the right to control the dangers they confront. 126 It's not a privilege to work. It's my right to be able to work. . . . I also have a right to know if I'm working with anything that's harmful. I should have the choice of whether or not to work with it. [P. 164.] 124. Disturbing evidence for this skepticism can be found in the federal government's heavy reliance on private laboratories to test chemicals. In 1976, the Food and Drug Administration discovered errors in the tests performed for it by the largest such enterprise, Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories. Investigations by government and the press over the next four years revealed the invalidity of most of the thousands of tests that had led to licensing hundreds of chemicals. See C. VAN Dec. 14, 1984 , at A23, col. 1 (thirty-six deaths and at least 500 severe cases of liver and kidney damage linked to Selacryn, approved by the FDA after insufficient clinical tests).
There is a real danger that government action will induce a false sense of confidence in citizens. Residents of the Love Canal area disregarded noxious fumes and skin rashes because the government's decision to build a school on the site and to grant mortgages to homebuyers indicated there was no danger. A. LEVINE, supra note 29, at 14. See also Hale & Perusse, supra note 76, at 83:
[R]eliance on false safeguards may indicate a basic problem of allocation of responsibility for safety; because thinking about our own safety is such a dissonance-producing activity it is more comfortable to take any reassurance, however falsely based, that someone else is thinking about it for us. 125. The public values information to the extent that it is involved in collecting the information and controlling its production and distribution. See Gricar & Baratta, Bridging the Information Gap at Three Mile Island: Radiation Monitoring by Citizens, 19 J. APPLIED BEHA v. SCI. 35 (1983) .
126. For a persuasive argument that workers should have the right to refuse dangerous working conditions, see M. GIBSON, supra note 39, at 57-86. See also Abel, supra note 15, at 702-10. Workers invoking a right-to-know law may be subject to employer reprisals. A pregnant woman employed in making optics asked her boss for a list of the chemicals to which she was exposed. When she received no response she asked to be transferred out of the laboratory and into an office job until she received the information (as she was entitled to do under a four-yearold state law). Instead she was dismissed. Her employer claimed he did not know of his legal obligation. The woman has since won a court ruling that she was illegally dismissed. Ousted Worker Wins a Suit Under Toxic Chemical Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at 42, col. 5 . But laws like this in 16 states and several municipalities may be preempted by a much weaker federal regulation that applies to only half as many workers (and no nonworkers) and to many fewer substances. 3 States Say OSHA Rule on Chemicals Weakens Their Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1984, at 26, col. 3. Those exposed to herbicides also insist on the right to control that exposure. In rural Oregon, residents used force against persistent spraying of their homes, farms, and families by trucks and helicopters of the U.S. Forest Department. See C. VAN STRUM, supra note 102, at 218-30. A small town in northern Illinois, like others in some northern and eastern states, has passed an ordinance requiring commercial pesticide applicafors to post a sign 72 hours after applying chemicals to lawns, stating, "This lawn chemically treated. Keep children and pets off for 72 hours." The law has been challenged on equal protection grounds in a lawsuit by the Pesticide Public Foundation. Lawn-Care Concerns Fight Pesticide Sign Rule in Illinois City, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1984, at 73, col. 1. [Vol. 83:772 When you do a job day in and day out, you're the expert on the job. You know how it runs. Management can design the machine, but the man that runs it for 10 years is going to know more about that machine than management. [P. 170.)127
What we need is a system of government that says you can do whatever you need to do to protect yourself on your job. [P. 127.] Nor are workers interested simply in maximizing their own safety at the expense of others, as the economists' view of human nature presupposes.
My wife is very upset about my working with all these chemicals. She would like me to quit. But if I were to do that and obtain another job, I would be just throwing in the towel, giving up that commitment to a safe and healthy workplace. I'd be reducing my own risk of occupational disease or accidents, but doing nothing for the workers who remain. I have a responsibility to see that it's a safe place to work. I don't want to leave it the same way I found it. [P. 109.] In order to take control of their lives, help all workers, and withstand employer reprisals, workers must act collectively. The traditional mechanism has been the union and, more recently, the Committees on Occupational Safety and Health that unite rank and file workers, union officials, health professionals, and social activists (pp. 104-06, 129, 161-62) . 128 Yet unions have disappointed many. Fewer than one in every five American workers belongs to a union. Only three international unions have had the interest and resources to employ staff with technical expertise in health and safety issues (pp. 116-17) . And, with some notable exceptions, American unionism has been preoccupied with bread-and-butter issues rather than safety 129 -a bias intensified by the recession of the 1970's and the Reagan administration's attack on organized labor. The workers in this book repeatedly voice disillusionment: union officials are invisible and inaccessible, unions are undemocratic, officials are too quick to use grievance procedures that inevitably result in compromise, and unions sometimes even discourage workers from claiming compensation (pp. 117, 119-20, 145) . Unions rarely wield their ultimate power: only 127. Although astronauts originally were intended to be little more than guinea pigs, passively exhibiting the effects of space travel upon humans and symbolizing man's conquest of space without having any responsibility for directing the mission, the intervention of the astronauts in the Apollo 13 mission was all that saved them from death and the mission from disaster. REv. 635 (1981). 0.7% of the 3885 strikes in 1980 were sparked by health and safety issues (p. 121 n.3). Workers are reluctant to strike for fear of losing wages and suffering retaliation (p. 122). Yet they realize that their only hope for autonomy is their right to withhold labor.
[I]f you don't have the right to strike, that is, the right to walk off the job and withhold your labor, then your boss is an absolute dictator who has the right to kill you because you don't have any choice. [P. 166 .]1 30 The portraits of risk presented by Nelkin and Brown and by Carson are diametrically opposed to the image that Bardach and Kagan seek to construct. It is no exaggeration to say that the former speak for workers and the latter for capital. Workers encounter extraordinary obstacles in naming the risks they experience, blaming their employers, and claiming enhanced safety or compensation for damage done. Yet capitalists believe it is far too easy to name, blame, and claim. Workers feel they voice too few grievances, capitalists that they assert too many. Workers claim the right, as victims, to speak out. Capitalists denounce such complaints as artifacts of overzealous regulation. Workers claim the expertise that comes from experience, while capitalists dismiss such lay pretensions, insisting on formal credentials and the scientism of cost-benefit analysis. Workers value collective action, through which they share knowledge, overcome fear, and acquire power; capitalists extol individualism (for others). Workers perceive risk as involuntary and blame those who control their lives; capitalists exaggerate individual freedom and blame the victim. Workers fear retaliation and experience the workplace as a locus of struggle; capitalists proclaim labor-management harmony and promise solicitude if workers only abandon their demands. Workers see regulatory agencies as weak and captive; capitalists see them as overbearing and unreasonable. Workers demand autonomy; capitalists believe that they alone should be autonomous, while workers should defer to the authority of capital and have faith in the paternalism of the "trusteeship stratum." Not for the first time do the conclusions of scholars reflect which side they are on.
IV. OLD SLOGANS, NEW STRUGGLES
The arguments in these three books are depressingly familiar. The message of Bardach and Kagan was put more succinctly thirty years ago by Charles Wilson, President Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense: What's good for General Motors is good for the country. Their solicitude for corporations who must stop inflicting risk on workers, consumers, and citizens evokes another memory of the fifties -how painful it was said to be for racists to stop discriminating. In opposition, both Carson's book and that of Nelkin and Brown document 130. For an example of a successful "work to rule" action (whereby employees adhere to the letter of company rules, slowing production), see pp. 120-21.
[ Vol. 83:772 once again how little worker health and safety weighs in the capitalist calculus of profit. Yet if the lessons are old, the battles always are new. People will not surrender their insistence on autonomy and equality in the confrontation with risk.
